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Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary field which aims to 
understand the mind. Pioneering research over the past 60 
years has yielded significant advances in describing the 
architecture of cognition. However, we suggest that the rate 
of progress seen in the last century may not be sustainable. 
While a central feature of natural phenomena is their 
redundancy, the defining feature of the mind is its 
complexity. Future research efforts may meet with 
diminishing returns, as informational redundancy in 
cognitive processes becomes increasingly difficult to 
identify.  
According to Algorithmic Information Theory (AIT), 
scientific understanding is furthered by exposing greater 
levels of redundancy in observational data. The goal of the 
scientist is to craft a model which can describe a dataset in 
the most concise terms. These models are called theories. 
The more compression a theory achieves, the greater its 
value (see Chaitin, 2007, for an overview of AIT). For 
example, Kepler’s heliocentric model of the heavens is 
considered superior to Ptolemy’s geocentric model, because 
it manages to describe astronomical observations in terms of 
three simple mathematical laws rather than a convoluted set 
of epicycles. AIT demonstrates that data compression is the 
only systematic means for generating predictions based on 
prior observations (Chaitin, 2007). All successful predictive 
systems are approximations of algorithmic induction. All 
useful contributions to human knowledge work by coaxing 
people into modifying their inductive strategies so that they 
better approximate algorithmic induction.  
The efficacy of science can be traced back to its utility in 
facilitating the development of concise descriptions of the 
natural world. The scientific method of proposing a 
hypothesis, gathering observational data and then evaluating 
the predictive accuracy of the hypothesis provides a 
powerful means of identifying informational redundancy 
and hence converging on a succinct description of a 
phenomenon. Over the past few centuries, this technique has 
proven so successful that it seems intuitive that it should 
deliver in any domain to which it is applied. However, AIT 
does not corroborate this intuition.  
Science works best when there are trivial patterns to be 
identified in a set of data. For example, if the orbits of the 
planets are monitored over a period of time, then 
redundancy quickly emerges in the observations. However, 
in cases where it is impossible to reduce a dataset, then no 
scientific theory can have any predictive power. Consider 
for example, a roulette wheel. In this case, the numbers 
which emerge are random. If one wants to represent the 
sequence of numbers then one has no option but to describe 
the full set. Because there is no redundancy, it is not 
possible to develop an elegant theory which exploits 
patterns in the data. In other words, it is not possible to 
explain the numbers which emerge from a roulette wheel.  
The question now arises: is cognition a phenomenon to 
which science can be usefully applied? Unlike the roulette 
wheel, the architecture of the mind is not random. And 
unlike natural phenomena such as the motion of celestial 
bodies, it seems unlikely to be trivial. The brain may present 
a type of phenomenon which algorithmic information 
theorists refer to as ‘deep’ (Bennett, 1988): one whose 
reducibility can never be exhausted by finite computational 
means. As greater levels of redundancy within a deep object 
are identified and extracted, the part which is left behind 
becomes less amenable to simplification. It becomes 
increasingly difficult to identify further redundancy: greater 
resources must be expended to make gains, and the theories 
which emerge have diminishing explanatory value. As a 
result, no matter how much effort is expended in unraveling 
the architecture of a deep object, the process of 
understanding it can never be completed.  
Is the mind a deep object? Theoretical findings in 
mathematics and computer science suggest that a 
fundamental limitation of knowledge is reached when a 
system attempts to process itself (e.g. Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorems, Turing’s halting problem). Given 
that a language cannot be strongly semantically self-
representational, then it seems unlikely that the language of 
understanding could be applied to and exhaust itself. In this 
case, the irreducible complexity of the mind would have to 
be acknowledged as a form of fundamental axiom, to be 
assumed rather than explained away. 
We speculate that future developments in information 
theory could place the intractable complexity of the mind at 
the centre of a new understanding of reality. Rather than 
being viewed as something external to knowledge, the 
assumption of this complexity might be recognized as the 
foundation relative to which all of our understanding is 
expressed, thereby undermining the meaningfulness of the 
goal to ‘understand’ the complexity of the mind. 
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